In this paper, we present a very important primitive called Information Checking Protocol (ICP) which plays an important role in constructing statistical Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Weak Secret Sharing (WSS) protocols. Informally, ICP is a tool for authenticating messages in the presence of computationally unbounded corrupted parties. Here we extend the basic bare-bone definition of ICP, introduced by Rabin et al. [3] and then present an ICP that attains the best communication complexity and round complexity among all the existing ICPs in the literature. We also show that our ICP satisfies several interesting properties such as linearity property which is an important requirement in many applications of ICP.
Introduction

Existing Literature and Existing Definition of ICP
The notion of ICP was first introduced by Rabin et al. [3] . Rabin et al. [3] have used ICP for constructing a statistical WSS protocol which was further used to design a statistical VSS protocol. Since then many ICPs have been designed [3, 1, 2] and used in constructing various statistical VSS [3, 1, 2] and WSS [3, 1, 2] protocols.
As described in [3, 1, 2] , an ICP is executed among three parties: a dealer D, an intermediary IN T and a verifier R. The dealer D hands over a secret value s to IN T . At a later stage, IN T is required to hand over s to R and convince R that s is indeed the value which IN T received from D.
Our New Definition of ICP
The basic definition of ICP involves only a single verifier R [3, 2, 1]. We extend this notion to multiple verifiers, specifically to n verifiers/parties denoted by P = {P 1 , . . . , P n } out of which at most t are corrupted by unbounded powerful active adversary. Moreover D and IN T are some specific party from P. Thus our ICP is executed among three entities: a dealer D ∈ P, an intermediary IN T ∈ P and the entire set P acting as verifiers. Moreover, in contrast to the existing ICPs that deal with single secret, our ICP can deal with multiple secrets concurrently and thus achieves better communication complexity than multiple executions of ICP dealing with single secret.
The multiple secret, multiple receiver ICP is useful in the design of efficient protocols for statistical VSS and WSS. Statistical VSS is possible iff n ≥ 2t + 1 (provided a physical broadcast channel is available in the system) and for the design of statistical VSS with optimal resilience, we work with n = 2t + 1. As our ICP is useful in such context, we design our ICP as well with n = 2t + 1. Thus our ICP can be used for statistical VSS and WSS and they can be used for statistical MPC with optimal resilience (i.e n = 2t + 1).
Our Network and Adversary Model
We consider a setting with n parties (we also call them as verifiers) P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } with n = 2t + 1, that are pairwise connected by a secure (or private) channel. We further assume that all parties have access to a common broadcast channel (that allows any party in P to send some information identically to all other parties in P). We assume the system to be synchronous. Therefore the protocols operate in a sequence of rounds, where in each round, a party performs some local computation, sends new messages to the other parties through the private channels and broadcasts some information over the broadcast channel, then it receives the messages that were sent by the other parties in this round on the private and broadcast channels.
The adversary that we consider is a static, threshold, active and rushing adversary having unbounded computing power. The adversary, denoted by A t , can corrupt at most t parties out of the n parties. The adversary controls and coordinates the actions of the corrupted/faulty parties in any arbitrary manner. We further allow the adversary to be rushing [2] , i.e. in every round of communication it can wait to hear the messages of the honest parties before sending his own messages. We consider a static adversary, who corrupts all the parties at the beginning of the protocol.
We assume that the messages sent through the channels are from a specified domain. Thus if a party receives a message which is not from the specified domain (or a party receives no message at all), then he replaces it with some pre-defined default message. Thus, we separately do not consider the case when no message or syntactically incorrect message is received by a party.
Structure of ICP
As in [3, 1] , our ICP is also structured into sequence of following three phases: 
The properties of ICP
Our ICP satisfies the following properties (which are almost same as the properties, satisfied by the ICP of [3, 2] ). In these properties, ǫ is called the error parameter. 4. ICP-Secrecy: If D and IN T are honest then till the end of Verification Phase, S is information theoretically secure from A t (that controls t verifiers in P).
The Road-map
In section 2, we present our novel ICP with its complete proof. In section 3, we compare our ICP with the existing ICPs and show that our ICP attains the best communication and round complexity among all existing ICPs. Section 4 introduces a definition and a notation for our ICP. Section 5 then concentrates on the linearity property of our ICP. Finally, we conclude this article in section 6.
Our Novel ICP
In this section, we present an ICP called as MVMS-ICP (MVMS stands for Multi Verifier Multi Secret). Protocol MVMS-ICP requires one round for Generation Phase and two rounds for Verification Phase and Revelation Phase each.
To bound the error probability by ǫ, our protocol MVMS-ICP operates over field F = GF (2 κ ), where ǫ ≥ n2 −κ . Hence we have |F| ≥ n ǫ . Moreover we assume that n = poly(log 1 ǫ ). Now each element from the field is represented by κ = log |F| = O(log n ǫ ) = O(log n + log 1 ǫ ) = O(log 1 ǫ ) bits (the last equality in the above sequence follows from our assumption that n = poly(log 1 ǫ )). We now present an informal idea of MVMS-ICP.
The Intuition: In MVMS-ICP, D selects a random polynomial F (x) of degree ℓ+t, whose lower order ℓ coefficients are the elements of S and delivers F (x) to IN T . In addition, D privately delivers to each individual verifier P i , the value of F (x) at a random, secret evaluation point α i . This distribution of information by D helps to achieve ICP-Correctness3 property. The reason is that if D is honest, then a corrupted IN T cannot produce an incorrect F ′ (x) = F (x) during Revelation Phase without being detected by an honest verifier with very high probability. This is because a corrupted IN T will have no information about the evaluation point of an honest verifier and hence with very high probability, F ′ (x) will not match with F (x) at the evaluation point held by an honest verifier.
The above distribution by D also maintains ICP-Secrecy property. This is because the degree of F (x) is ℓ + t. But only up to t points on F (x) will be known to A t through t corrupted verifiers. Therefore A t will fall short by ℓ points to uniquely interpolate F (x). But the above distribution alone is not enough to achieve ICP-Correctness2. A corrupted D might distribute F (x) to IN T and value of some other polynomial (different from F (x)) to each honest verifier. To detect this situation, IN T and the verifiers interact in zero knowledge fashion to check the consistency of F (x) held by IN T and the values held by individual verifiers. The specific details of the zero knowledge, along with other formal steps of protocol MVMS-ICP are given in Fig. 1 .
We now prove the properties of protocol MVMS-ICP. 1. D picks and sends the following to IN T : (a) A random degree-(ℓ + t) polynomial F (x) over F, such that the lower order ℓ coefficients of F (x) are elements of S. (b) A random degree-(ℓ + t) polynomial R(x) over F. 2. D privately sends the following to every verifier Pi:
(a) (αi, vi, ri), where αi ∈ F − {0} is random (all αi's are distinct), vi = F (αi) and ri = R(αi).
Ver(D, IN T, P, S, ǫ) : This will take two rounds
Round 2:
Reveal(D, IN T, P, S, ǫ) : This will take two rounds
Round 2: Verifier Pi broadcasts Accept in the following conditions. Proof: We consider the case when D is corrupted, because when D is honest, the lemma follows from Lemma 1. Now the proof can be divided into following two cases:
This implies that D has broadcasted S during Round 2 of Ver.
In this case, the lemma holds trivially, without any error. This is because the honest IN T will correctly broadcast ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) = S during Round 1 of Reveal and every honest verifier will find that S broadcasted by IN T is same as the one that was broadcasted by D during Round 2 of Ver. So all honest verifiers (at least t + 1) will broadcast Accept and hence ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) will be accepted by all honest verifiers.
ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) = F (x):
This implies that D has not broadcasted anything during Round 2 of Ver. Here, we first show that except with probability ǫ n , each honest verifier will broadcast Accept during Reveal. So let P i be an honest verifier. We have now the following cases depending on the relation that holds between the information held by IN T (i.e (F (x), R(x))) and information held by the honest P i (i.e (α i , v i , r i )):
Here P i will broadcast Accept without any error probability as condition
Here P i will broadcast Accept without any error probability, as condition C2 (i.e B(α i ) = dv i + r i ) will hold.
(c) If F (α i ) = v i and R(α i ) = r i : Here P i will broadcast Accept except with probability ǫ n , as condition C2 will hold, except with probability ǫ n (see Claim 2).
As shown above, there is a negligible error probability of ǫ n with which an honest P i may broadcast Reject when F (α i ) = v i and R(α i ) = r i (i.e the third case). This happens if a corrupted D can guess the unique d in Gen, corresponding to P i and it so happens that IN T also selects the same d in Ver and therefore condition C2 does not hold good for P i in Reveal. Now D can guess a d i for each honest verifier P i and if it so happens that honest IN T chooses d which is same as one of those t + 1 d i 's guessed by D, then condition C2 will not be satisfied for the honest verifier P i for whom d i = d and therefore P i will broadcast Reject. This may lead to the rejection of ICSig(D, IN T, P, S), as t corrupted verifiers may always broadcast Reject. But the above event can happen with error probability t+1 |F|−1 = (t + 1) ǫ n ≈ ǫ. This is because there are t + 1 d i 's and IN T has selected some d randomly from F \ {0}. This implies that all honest verifiers will broadcast Accept during Reveal, except with error probability ǫ.
This completes the proof of the lemma. 2
Lemma 3 (ICP-Correctness3) If D is honest then during Reveal, with probability at least 1 − ǫ, every ICSig(D, IN T, P, S ′ ) with S ′ = S revealed by a corrupted IN T will be rejected by honest verifiers.
Proof: Here again we have the following two cases:
ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) = S:
This implies that D has broadcasted S during Round 2 of Ver. In this case if a corrupted IN T tries to reveal ICSig(D, IN T, P, S ′ ) where S ′ = S then all honest verifiers (at least t + 1) will broadcast Reject during Reveal. This is because the honest verifiers will find that S ′ is not same as S which was broadcasted by D during Round 2 of Ver.
ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) = F (x):
This implies that D has not broadcasted anything during Round 2 of Ver. Here a corrupted IN T can produce S ′ = S by broadcasting F ′ (x) = F (x) during Reveal such that the lower order ℓ coefficients of F ′ (x) is S ′ . We now claim that if IN T does so, then except with probability ǫ n , an honest verifier P i will broadcast Reject during Reveal. In the following, we show that the conditions for which the honest verifier P i would broadcast Accept are either impossible or may happen with probability Hence the probability that IN T can ensure F ′ (α i ) = v i = F (α i ) is same as the probability with which IN T can correctly guess α i , which is at most
This case is never possible because D is honest. If B(α i ) = dv i + r i corresponding to P i , then honest D would have broadcasted S during Round 2 of Ver and hence ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) would have been equal to S, which is a contradiction to our assumption that ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) = F (x).
As shown above, there is a negligible error probability of ǫ n with which an honest P i may broadcast Accept, even if the corrupted IN T produces F ′ (x) = F (x). This happens if the corrupted IN T can guess α i corresponding to honest verifier P i . Now there are t + 1 honest verifiers. A corrupted IN T can guess α i for any one of those t + 1 honest verifiers and thereby can ensure that F ′ (α i ) = v i holds for some honest P i (which in turn implies P i will broadcast Accept). This will ensure that IN T 's ICSig(D, IN T, P, S ′ ) will be accepted, as t corrupted verifiers may always broadcast Accept. But the above event can happen with probability at most t+1 |F|−1 = (t + 1) ǫ n ≈ ǫ. This asserts that every ICSig(D, IN T, P, S ′ ) with S ′ = S, revealed by a corrupted IN T will be rejected by all honest verifiers with probability at least (1 − ǫ). 2 Lemma 4 (ICP-Secrecy) If D and IN T are honest, then till the end of Ver, S is information theoretically secure from A t (that controls t verifiers in P).
Proof: During Gen, A t will know t distinct points on F (x) and R(x). Since both F (x) and R(x) are of degree-(ℓ + t), the lower order ℓ coefficients of both F (x) and R(x) are information theoretically secure. During Ver, A t will know d and dF (x) + R(x). Since both F (x) and R(x) are random and independent of each other, the lower order ℓ coefficients of F (x) remain to be information theoretically secure. Also, if D and IN T are honest, then D will never broadcast S during Ver (from Claim 1). Hence the lemma. Both the ICPs of [3] and [2] are designed in single verifier and single secret model. But they can be extended to the case of multiple (i.e. n) verifiers easily. Indeed in [3, 2] , the single verifier ICPs were executed in parallel for n verifiers in the implementation of VSS protocols. Moreover, as the protocols were designed for single secret, they can be extended for ℓ secrets by ℓ parallel invocations of the protocols. Since protocol MVMS-ICP is designed to handle n verifiers and ℓ secrets concurrently, in Table 1 , we compare our MVMS-ICP with the ICPs of [3] and [2] extended for n verifiers and ℓ secrets. 
4 Few Remarks, Definitions and Notations on ICP
MVMS-ICP with One Round of Reveal
It is interesting to note that if we restrict the adversary A t to a non-rushing adversary then the two rounds of Reveal can be collapsed into a single round where IN T broadcasts ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) and simultaneously every verifiers broadcast their values (α i , v i , r i ). It is easy to check that all the properties of ICP will hold in such a case. But in the presence of rushing adversary, the two rounds are needed in order to force a corrupted IN T to commit to the polynomial F (x) prior to seeing the evaluation points, as this knowledge can enable the adversary to publish a polynomial that can match with the values broadcasted by the honest verifiers, which would violate the ICP-Correctness3 property of the protocol. However, if the adversary is non-rushing then this property is achieved via the synchronicity of the step. Hence, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4 If the adversary is non-rushing then there exists an efficient ICP with one round in Gen, two rounds in Ver and one round in Reveal.
A Definition and a Notation
Definition 1 (IC Signature with ǫ Error) An IC signature ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) for some secret S, is said to have ǫ error, if it satisfies the following: 1. ICP-Correctness1 without any error; 2. ICP-Correctness2 with error probability of at most ǫ; 3. ICP-Correctness3 with error probability of at most ǫ; 4. ICP-Secrecy without any error.
Notice that if an IC signature is generated in MVMS-ICP (which is executed with error parameter ǫ), then the IC signature will have ǫ error. This follows from the proofs of Lemma 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
Linearity of Protocol MVMS-ICP
The IC signature generated in MVMS-ICP satisfies linearity property, which may be required in many applications of ICP (specifically in statistical VSS and MPC [2, 3] ). Specifically, consider the following settings: let in q different instances of MVMS-ICP, D has handed over IC Signature on q different set of ℓ secrets to IN T , namely S i = (s 1 i , . . . , s ℓ i ), for i = 1, . . . , q. Moreover, let D has used the same α i as secret evaluation point for verifier P i in all the q instances of MVMS-ICP (an honest D can always ensure it). This condition on α i is very important and we refer this as the condition for linearity of IC signatures. Though linearity property accounts for any form of linear function, we will demonstrate the linearity property with respect to addition operation (for simplicity). So let S = S 1 + . . . + S q , where S = (s 1 , . . . , s ℓ ) and s l = s l 1 + . . . + s l q , for l = 1, . . . , ℓ. Now IN T can compute ICSig(D, IN T, P, S) using ICSig(D, IN T, P, S i ) for i = 1, . . . , q and the verifiers can compute verification information corresponding to ICSig(D, IN T, P, S), without doing any further communication. For the sake of completeness, we present a protocol in Fig. 2 showing how IN T and verifiers can achieve the above. Informally in the protocol we use the linearity property of polynomials. That is, if ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 1 ) = F 1 (x) and ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 2 ) = F 2 (x), then ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 1 + S 2 ) = F 1 (x) + F 2 (x). Similarly, if F 1 (α i ) and F 2 (α i ) are the verification information of verifier P i corresponding to ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 1 ) and ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 2 ) respectively, then F 1 (α i ) + F 2 (α i ) will be the verification information of verifier P i corresponding to ICSig(D, IN T, P, S 1 + S 2 ).
In the protocol, it might be possible that some ICSig(D, IN T, P, S i ) is a polynomial of degree ℓ + t (this implies that D has not broadcasted anything during Ver of i th signature giving instance), while some other ICSig(D, IN T, P, S j ) is S j (this implies that D has broadcasted S j during Ver of j th signature giving instance). In such a case, IN T finds a ℓ + t degree polynomial F j (x), whose lower order ℓ coefficients are elements of S j and the remaining coefficients are some publicly known default values and assumes the polynomial to be ICSig(D, IN T, P, S j ). Notice that such F j (x) will be known publicly, as S j is broadcasted by D. Accordingly, every verifier P i considers F j (α i ) as his verification information corresponding to ICSig(D, IN T, P, S j ). Once this is done then all the q IC signatures will be ℓ + t degree polynomials and hence IN T can use the linearity property of the polynomials (as explained above) to compute the addition of IC signatures. Now we show that a linearly combined IC signature that is computed from q IC signatures (using protocol in Fig. 2 ), each having ǫ error, will have ǫ error. For this, we prove the following lemma:
